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Axel Honneth has called for a change of focus in Critical Theory 
"from the self-generated independence of systems to the damage and 
distortion of social relations of recognition."1 This important shift in 
focus from structural theoretical models to an exploration of the relations 
of recognition opens Critical Theory's inquiries to the processes of 
interpersonal interaction and communication. This is in keeping with 
Honneth's assertion that individuals' self-realization and autonomy 
depends on their experiences of social recognition; therefore, 
misrecognition is experienced as a threat to an individual's self-
realization. However, I argue that Honneth does not shift his 
methodological focus enough to succeed in his goal of illuminating the 
social relations of recognition. 
In this paper, I wish to focus on one aspect of Axel Honneth's vast 
work: Honneth's classification of recognition and misrecognition in 
terms of three structural spheres of recognition that correspond to 
Hegel's stages of social interaction—the legal, the economic, and the 
personal.2 Honneth maps his three subspecies of recognition—self-
respect, self-esteem, and self-confidence—respectively, to the legal, 
economic, and personal spheres. My broader research aim is to craft a 
methodology that will help us understand the reasons for occurrences of 
misrecognition behaviors that are injustices to others, and I am not 
convinced that Honneth's Hegelian-inspired typology is the best way to 
understand recognition and misrecognition. The question I am asking 
here is this: When we consider a particular behavior, does mapping the 
                                                             
1 Honneth 2007, p. 72. 
2 See, for example, Honneth's discussion in Honneth 1995b, pp. 18-28. 
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behavior onto the legal, the economic, and the personal spheres of 
recognition sufficiently illuminate what is going on? My answer is no. 
Though regulated directly by recognition norms, human behaviors and 
experiences are not directly linked to only one of Honneth's three 
structural spheres—in everyday life the spheres continually overlap and 
are interwoven. The complexity of everyday life means that recognition 
and misrecognition behaviors often cannot be mapped directly to one 
sphere of recognition.  
A deeper analysis of several of Honneth's own examples of 
recognition behaviors shows they cannot be mapped exactly to his three 
structural spheres. I will pick two of his examples to illustrate. First is 
Honneth's example of recognition or misrecognition of workers on the 
basis of the level of economic compensation they receive from their 
employers. For Honneth, employees are recognized when their economic 
compensation matches their contributions, and he maps this 
contribution tracking directly to the economic sphere of civil society and 
the prestige and reputation received in that sphere.3 But a company's 
gestures of recognition of employees, sincere or not, appeal to multiple 
dimensions of its employees' wants and needs, not simply economic 
ones, and involve combinations of legal, economic, and personal factors 
that cannot be placed in one or even two spheres. An employer can, for 
example, attempt to overcome an unjustly low level of economic 
compensation by appealing to workers' self-esteem by extolling their 
value or by appealing to their sense of duty to sacrifice for the greater 
good. Similarly, the experience of misrecognition in receiving an unjustly 
low level of economic compensation affects an individual worker not only 
in the economic sphere of self-esteem but also in combinations of self-
respect, self-esteem, and self-confidence.  
Similarly, Honneth's example of social ostracization4 is a behavior 
that causes moral injuries not just to an individual's legal self-respect, but 
also to that individual's social self-esteem and personal self-confidence. 
It would seem insufficient to map social ostracization only to the legal 
sphere, Furthermore, Honneth's differentiation between modes of social 
solidarity and familial love into the separate spheres of the community 
and the family seems to separate recognition relations between 
                                                             
3 Honneth 2007, pp. 81-82, 92. Honneth 2012, pp. 78, 207. 
4 Honneth 1995a, pp. 254-255. Honneth 1995b, pp. 133-134.  
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individuals unnaturally. In the normative terms of recognition relations, 
solidarity within a community and love within a family are both 
emotional bonds of devotion, and Honneth does not make a compelling 
argument for his treatment of them as separate modes of recognition. If 
we shift the conversation to misrecognition, how would betrayal of a 
friend be a qualitatively different normative violation than betrayal of a 
family member? Would we not gain a better understanding of 
misrecognition by looking at the structure of betrayal rather than 
assuming a difference between family and friendship? If we focus on the 
misrecognition behaviors themselves more than on the social sphere in 
which they occur, we would we see that Honneth's formal mapping of 
recognition and misrecognition to spheres of social levels is inadequate. 
Particular recognition and misrecognition behaviors do not fall neatly 
into three subspecies.  
Honneth's three spheres of recognition and misrecognition provide 
a top-down view that stems from his Hegelian picture of society as a 
macrosocial recognition order. This view leads Honneth to the idea that 
instances of misrecognition are best understood as stemming from 
endemic pathologies that occur within social institutions. Honneth's 
emphasis on institutional structures is a natural outgrowth of the legacy 
of Critical Theory, and the institutional inclination of his philosophy 
remains despite his moves to distance himself from systematic 
philosophies. Honneth's institutional emphasis is reflected in his holistic 
portrayal of social pathology. Honneth defines a social pathology as an 
organic aberration of social development that prevents members of a 
society from living a "good life"5 or that "significantly impairs the ability 
to take part rationally in important forms of social cooperation."6 
Honneth is critical of "deplorable social states of affairs" not just because 
they are violations of principles of justice but also because they are 
disorders that, "like psychic illnesses, limit or deform possibilities of 
living taken to be ‘normal’ or ‘healthy.’"7 The concept of a pathology is 
used in critical social theory in the same way it is used in medicine or 
psychology—to identify that which hinders a body's or psyche's ability to 
function. Honneth believes, however, that unlike in medicine or 
                                                             
5 Honneth 2007, p. 4. 
6 Honneth 2013, p. 86. 
7 Honneth 2007, p. 35. 
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psychology, the concept of pathology in social theory cannot be spoken 
of strictly in terms of an individual but must be related to social life as a 
whole.8 Honneth's reasoning for this is that because social norms are 
always culturally defined, our consideration of disorders of social norms 
must refer to society as a whole. Honneth emphasizes the importance of 
social norms and social relations of recognition for the health of 
individuals to achieve self-esteem and self-respect. It is consistent, 
therefore, for him to conceive of social pathologies in terms of deviations 
from the social conditions that enable human self-realization. Honneth 
thus focuses on the concrete social conditions and processes that are 
prerequisites for human self-realization, essentially linking social 
pathologies with disorders of these macrosocial social conditions and 
processes. Injustice, then, for Honneth is a systematic product of social 
institutions. Honneth's focus is, in terms of scale, on the macrosocial—
society as a whole—a methodological focus that is traditional within 
Critical Theory. 
Although Honneth maintains the macrosocial emphasis of his 
predecessors, he proposes a change in the focus of Critical Theory. 
Honneth observes that theoretical models that seek to define social 
interaction strictly in terms of structuralist or linguistic conditions 
cannot fully grasp the normative presuppositions of social interaction 
that are constituted by social recognition. Individuals, Honneth says, have 
normative expectations of social recognition and experience receiving 
recognition and misrecognition. Individuals’ expectations and 
experiences are pretheoretical facts, Honneth says, meaning that 
individuals experience their world prior to any consideration of theory. 
He therefore argues that when social theory bases its critique on the 
relations of recognition rather than on linguistic-theoretical paradigms, 
it can better identify individuals' normative expectations involved in 
social interaction.9 Honneth's proposed shift in critical focus reflects the 
reality that individuals’ normative presuppositions, and their fulfillment 
or disappointment, are issues of relations of recognition as lived by social 
individuals.  
Despite Honneth's shift to relations of recognition, he considers 
these relations in terms of the macrosocial spheres. In so doing, his view 
                                                             
8 Honneth 2007, p. 34.  
9  Honneth 2007, pp. 69-72. 
Douglas Giles 
Extending Honneth’s Shift in Focus for Critical Theory 
 [114] 
of misrecognition remains functionalist—the individual is reduced to a 
functional role playing out macrosocial interactions. Honneth’s theory 
does not sufficiently include the role of the autonomous individual, and 
this lack renders his shift in focus incomplete. A good illustration of 
Honneth's functionalist reduction is his portrayal of criminal acts. 
Danielle Petherbridge observes that Honneth's account of crime, which 
is based on his reading of Hegel, reduced crime to purely a pathology of 
recognition, 10 which within Honneth’s picture, is a pathology of 
institutions. I agree with Petherbridge's assessment of Honneth's 
account as portraying misrecognition in "almost functionalist terms, 
merely as the means by which originary relations of recognition are 
revealed, as a 'disturbance' of already existing recognition relations."11 
The contradiction in Honneth's account of recognition and 
misrecognition is that on the one hand, he sees recognition as vital for an 
individual's autonomy, but, on the other hand, he places little importance 
on the individual’s role in the relations of recognition and misrecognition 
that affect individuals. Honneth’s macrosocial view  reduces the 
individual to functionalist terms. One could argue in defense of this 
seeming contradiction that it is recognition that grants an individual the 
capacity for autonomous action and that without this recognition the 
individual is merely functional—merely reacting to stimulus without 
possessing individual autonomy. However, a lack of receiving recognition 
cannot alone account for why an individual would engage in a criminal 
act nor can criminal acts be reduced to negative responses to a lack of 
recognition. To be fair, Honneth probably is not intentionally committing 
himself to such a reductionism, but his account remains problematic in it 
not sufficiently including the role of the individual agent in human 
behavior such as criminal acts.  
The question of crime is an example of how Honneth's spheres of 
recognition and misrecognition are limited by being too formally 
oriented to the three macrosocial spheres. Criminal acts are, by 
definition, within the legal sphere, but such acts do not occur strictly 
within legal forms of social relations and the motivation for criminal acts 
                                                             
10 Petherbridge 2013, p. 97. 
11 Petherbridge 2013, p. 98. Petherbridge, in this quote, specifically responds to 
Honneth's portrayal of criminal acts, but I think the criticism of functionalism applies 
to all of Honneth's forms of misrecognition. 
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cannot be reduced purely to the legal sphere of recognition. Criminal acts 
can occur within social or personal relations and have personal 
motivations, including negative feelings, revenge, resentment, and desire 
for power.12 Victims of crime certainly suffer a legal moral injury, but they 
also suffer moral injuries to their self-esteem and their ability to trust 
others. Honneth partially acknowledges this, mentioning briefly that in 
resisting a perpetrator, victims of crime defend not only their legal rights 
but also their identity.13 However, Honneth's account of misrecognition 
behaviors leans too heavily on the notion of institutional social 
misdevelopments as the cause for individual acts of injustice such as 
criminal acts and avoids the complex question of how the process of 
individual identity formation itself contributes to misrecognition 
behaviors. Institutional misrecognitions are undeniably important, but 
they do not exhaust the possibilities of misrecognition. There is also an 
individual level of misrecognition, or what Charles Taylor calls the 
intimate sphere, in contrast to a public sphere.14 Regardless of the terms 
used, the significant difference between misrecognition in a broader 
social sphere and in a narrower personal sphere is worth exploring. I 
argue that an emphasis on institutional misrecognition misses key causes 
of, and indeed the very nature of, social pathologies. It is fair to say that 
Honneth does adopt a view of social action that includes the relations 
between individual actors, but I argue that he does not adopt this view 
sufficiently to include in his philosophy the individual as actor. Honneth’s 
shift in focus to the individual needs to go deeper and include an 
exploration of the relation between the individual and misrecognition 
behaviors. For example. Honneth's account remains largely formal and 
functionalist and does not account adequately for how an individual 
proceeds from suffering misrecognition to engaging in a criminal act. I 
argue that, although Honneth is correct that misrecognition contributes 
to criminal acts, we would do well to consider the causes and effects of 
crime within a differently structured typology of recognition and 
misrecognition that takes individuals and their particular circumstances 
more into consideration. 
                                                             
12 Petherbridge 2013, p. 97. 
13 Honneth 1995b, p. 21. 
14 Taylor 1995, p. 233. 
Douglas Giles 
Extending Honneth’s Shift in Focus for Critical Theory 
 [116] 
Despite Honneth's stated intention to avoid systematic theories of 
the social, he does not succeed entirely. His inclusion of the need to 
consider relations of recognition in Critical Theory is a contribution, but 
he underestimates the important roles that individuals play in 
recognition and misrecognition behaviors. Recognition is a relation 
between individuals, which means that the social norms of recognition 
must be applied by an individual and that the occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of recognition involves individuals. Without individuals 
acting, there is no recognition. I do not suggest that Honneth denies this, 
but he insufficiently explores its dimensions and implications. Honneth 
is not unaware of personal recognitions, but he includes them only in 
terms of his formal spheres of recognition, placing receiving recognition 
from other individuals predominantly within the sphere of family 
relationships—respect and esteem he sees coming predominantly from 
the state and civil society, respectively. I argue that individuals are 
involved in generating instances of recognition and misrecognition 
behaviors in all social spheres, and not only within family relationships 
as Honneth implies. Legal and civil society can act only through the 
actions of individuals.  
I argue that Honneth's spheres and related subspecies of 
recognition are formal theoretical distinctions that, though valuable in 
helping us understand institutional recognition and misrecognition, do 
not do justice to the dynamics of intersubjective relations and personal 
recognition and misrecognition. The complexity of intersubjective 
experiences and identity formation calls for a more robust picture that 
reflects the complex and dynamic experiences of individuals in their 
social relations. An individual experiences recognition and 
misrecognition not in terms of formal categories but as specific instances 
of behavior in which that individual is involved. Although intersubjective 
relations of recognition and misrecognition occur according to social 
norms, these relations have an essential individual-centered nature. An 
individual's experiences of recognition and misrecognition are specific to 
that individual and his or her specific life. Rather than using Honneth's 
typological strategy of mapping recognition onto Hegel's formal spheres, 
I argue that it will be more fruitful to approach the analysis of recognition 
and misrecognition through the interpersonal recognition relations and 
behaviors themselves as experienced by the individuals involved.  
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Honneth includes the experiences of recognition as building blocks, 
or lack thereof, in individual autonomy, but he underplays the 
importance of the individual's role in the generation of recognition and 
misrecognition behaviors that affect others' autonomy. Institutional 
recognition plays an important part of individuals' lives, but so does 
personal recognition, and the boundary between the two is highly 
permeable. Honneth is correct about the importance of recognition for 
individual autonomy. This means that recognition and misrecognition are 
issues of importance in an individual's life. Our analysis needs to focus on 
individuals' experiences of recognition and misrecognition and the 
effects those experiences have on them. This change of approach would 
remedy Honneth's overemphasis on institutional recognition and 
misrecognition that leaves little room for consideration of the personal 
dimensions of recognition and misrecognition. 
The Hegelian triad of social spheres is not a sufficient basis for an 
exploration of misrecognition behaviors. To understand misrecognition 
behaviors, we need to seek a picture of misrecognition that reflects the 
complex diversity of individuals' lived experiences and practices, gives 
sufficient attention to interpersonal recognition and misrecognition, and 
offers potential reasons for why individuals might engage in 
misrecognition behaviors. Given the intersubjective nature of 
recognition, our attention is properly focused on the individual who is 
immersed in a culture that provides the normative arena in which the 
individual acts and attempts to achieve self-realization and autonomy. An 
individual-level account of misrecognition will not be easy to craft 
because it entails going beyond reductionist theoretical systems and 
engaging in the complexities of individual experiences and responses to 
those experiences. However, because relations of recognition are 
relations between individuals, our analysis of the injustice of 
misrecognition also would have to look at the individuals involved, a 
dimension which is underrepresented in Honneth's account. 
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ABSTRACT 
Axel Honneth has called for a change of focus in Critical Theory "from the 
self-generated independence of systems to the damage and distortion of 
social relations of recognition." I argue that Honneth does not shift his 
methodological focus sufficiently to succeed in his goal of illuminating 
the social relations of recognition. Despite Honneth's shift to relations of 
recognition, he considers these relations in terms of the macrosocial 
Hegelian triad of social spheres of recognition. A deeper analysis of 
recognition behaviors shows they cannot be mapped exactly to these 
spheres. I conclude that the Hegelian triad of social spheres is an 
insufficient basis for an exploration of misrecognition behaviors. To 
understand misrecognition, we need to seek a picture of misrecognition 
that reflects the complex diversity of individuals' lived experiences and 
practices, gives sufficient attention to interpersonal recognition and 
misrecognition, and offers potential reasons for why individuals might 
engage in misrecognition behaviors. 
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